Anchoring Bias: Definition, Examples and How to Avoid It
How the first number you see shapes the judgments that follow, why even experts are affected, and what actually reduces the pull.
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Anchoring bias is the tendency for an initial piece of information — typically a number — to disproportionately shape subsequent judgments, even when the initial information is arbitrary or known to be irrelevant. For example, people who are first asked whether a figure is higher or lower than 65 later give much higher estimates than people first asked about 10. First demonstrated systematically by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in their 1974 paper on judgment heuristics, the anchoring effect has been replicated in hundreds of studies and is one of the most robust findings in judgment and decision-making research, including in large multi-lab replication projects.
Anchoring is striking because it works even when people are warned about it, even when the anchor is plainly nonsense, and even among experts in the relevant field. It is at work when a real-estate agent quotes a price, when a court reads a prosecutor's recommended sentence, when a job candidate hears the first salary number, and when a doctor sees a chart that already contains a tentative diagnosis. Anyone who issues, receives, or relies on numbers in decision-making is affected by it; the question is not whether but how much.
Understanding Anchoring Bias
A Precise Definition
Anchoring bias is the phenomenon by which exposure to an initial value — the anchor — pulls subsequent numerical or evaluative judgments toward that value. The anchor can be relevant (a comparable house's price) or irrelevant (the last two digits of one's phone number). It can be supplied by the situation, by another person, or by oneself. Whatever its source, once it is in mind, it exerts gravitational pull on whatever judgment comes next.
The bias is not about being persuaded by the anchor. People often know the anchor is suspect and try to correct for it. The problem is that the correction is typically insufficient — they move away from the anchor, but not far enough to reach the answer they would have given without it. The final judgment lies somewhere between the anchor and the unbiased estimate, with the anchor doing more of the work than the judge appreciates.
Two Big Findings
Two findings from the research literature are particularly worth holding onto. First, the anchoring effect is large. In the original studies and many replications, judgments under different anchors differ by a substantial fraction of the gap between the anchors — often roughly half or more. Second, the effect persists when participants are told that the anchor was randomly generated and is unrelated to the question being judged. Knowledge of the anchor's irrelevance reduces but does not eliminate its influence.
Different Kinds of Anchors
Researchers distinguish several types. Externally provided anchors are numbers given by another person or by the situation — an opening offer, a quoted price, a published statistic. Self-generated anchors arise when a judge thinks of an initial estimate themselves — for example, starting from a known reference point and adjusting. Implicit anchors are numbers that appear in the background, perhaps as part of an unrelated question, and still affect a subsequent judgment. Different mechanisms may dominate in different cases, but the directional effect — pull toward the anchor — is broadly shared.
Not the Same as Suggestion
It is tempting to read anchoring as a form of social suggestion or persuasion, but the experimental evidence shows it is something deeper. People anchor on numbers they generated themselves, on numbers they were told are irrelevant, and on numbers that come from a transparently random source like a spinning wheel. Whatever the bias is, it is not simply a willingness to be swayed by the speaker.
The Research Foundation
The Wheel of Fortune Study
The most famous demonstration of anchoring comes from Tversky and Kahneman's 1974 paper. They asked participants to estimate the percentage of African nations in the United Nations. Before answering, each participant watched a wheel of fortune spin and stop on a number — but the wheel was secretly rigged to stop on either 10 or 65. Participants first wrote down whether they thought the true percentage was above or below the wheel's number, then estimated the percentage itself. Those who saw a 10 estimated, on average, around 25%. Those who saw a 65 estimated, on average, around 45%. The wheel's number — explicitly random, transparently irrelevant — had moved estimates by roughly 20 percentage points.
Multiplication Problems
In another study from the same line of research, participants were given five seconds to estimate a multiplication expression: 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8 or 8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1. Although the products are identical, the ascending sequence produced lower estimates (median around 512) and the descending sequence produced higher ones (median around 2,250). The actual answer is 40,320. Two key features of anchoring appear here: an initial computation acts as an anchor, and the final judgment falls far short of the truth because adjustment from the anchor is insufficient.
Insufficient Adjustment
Tversky and Kahneman's original interpretation was that judgment under uncertainty often proceeds by anchoring on an initial value and then adjusting. The adjustment, however, terminates prematurely — typically as soon as a "plausible" range is reached — so the final judgment remains too close to the anchor. This account, sometimes called the anchor-and-adjust heuristic, applies particularly well to cases where the judge consciously starts from a known reference and adjusts.
The Selective Accessibility Model
Later work, particularly by Fritz Strack and Thomas Mussweiler in the 1990s, proposed a different mechanism for many anchoring effects. On their account, evaluating the anchor — asking "Is this quantity higher or lower than the anchor?" — activates information consistent with the anchor being correct. That information remains active in memory and is then used when generating the final estimate. The bias arises from selective retrieval rather than from explicit anchoring-and-adjustment. Both mechanisms likely operate in different situations.
Replications and Boundary Conditions
Anchoring has held up better than many classic findings in psychology. In the Many Labs 1 project published in 2014, dozens of laboratories in several countries reran a set of classic studies, and the basic anchoring effect on numerical estimates replicated strongly. Not every variant is so robust, though. In a well-known 2003 study, Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec found that the last two digits of people's social security numbers influenced how much they were willing to pay for products such as wine and computer accessories. Later replications, including a 2014 study by Zacharias Maniadis, Fabio Tufano and John List and larger studies since, have generally found that this effect on willingness to pay is real but considerably smaller than originally reported.
The effect tends to be smaller, but not absent, when judges have strong domain knowledge and when the anchor is wildly implausible, although even extreme anchors can still pull estimates. Financial incentives for accuracy generally do little to reduce anchoring on externally provided numbers, which Tversky and Kahneman noted in their original paper.
Anchoring in Experts
One of the more striking findings is that experienced professionals are not immune. In a 1987 study, Gregory Northcraft and Margaret Neale gave real-estate agents a tour of a house along with information that differed only in the listed price; the agents' appraisals moved substantially with the listing price, even though most said the listing had not influenced them. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack found in 2006 that experienced German judges gave longer sentences in a hypothetical case after rolling dice that had been loaded to show a higher number. Similar effects have been reported for physicians considering diagnostic possibilities. Expertise reduces but does not eliminate anchoring.
How It Works
Anchoring as a Shortcut
From a cognitive-economy perspective, anchoring is not a glitch but a reasonable strategy. When asked to estimate an unfamiliar quantity, starting from any available reference point and adjusting from there saves the mental work of building an estimate from scratch. The trouble is that the strategy systematically over-weights the starting point, especially when the starting point is salient and the question is hard.
Two Mechanisms, Often Both Active
The two main mechanistic accounts — insufficient adjustment and selective accessibility — are not mutually exclusive. For self-generated anchors, where the judge knows they are starting from a reference and explicitly trying to adjust, the adjustment account fits well. For experimenter-provided or environmentally supplied anchors, where the judge merely had to consider the anchor first, the selective accessibility account often fits better. In real-world cases like negotiations, both mechanisms can be at work in the same exchange.
Why Adjustment Stops Too Early
Adjustment from an anchor proceeds until the judge feels they have reached a plausible range. But "plausible" is a wide zone, and the brain stops at the near edge of it rather than searching for the center. The result is a final estimate that is closer to the anchor than to the truth. Faster, less deliberate adjustment produces larger anchoring effects; slower, more incentivized adjustment reduces them somewhat.
The Role of Memory and Priming
Considering whether a quantity is above or below an anchor — the question typically used in anchoring studies — activates examples and associations consistent with that anchor. In one of Strack and Mussweiler's studies, people were asked whether Mahatma Gandhi died before or after the age of 140 (or, for others, the age of 9) — anchors everyone knew were impossible. Yet the high-anchor group still gave higher estimates of his age at death. If asked whether Gandhi was older or younger than 140 when he died, you are likely to recall facts that suggest he lived a long life. When you then estimate his actual age at death, those facts disproportionately shape the answer. The anchor reshapes the contents of memory available for the next judgment.
Numerical and Magnitude Effects
Anchoring is partly a numerical phenomenon — the brain treats numbers on a mental number line, and exposure to a large number activates the upper region of that line. This may help explain why even seemingly nonsensical anchors (like the last digits of an identification number) can have small but measurable effects on subsequent numerical estimates. The general principle is that whatever is in the cognitive workspace when a judgment is made shapes that judgment.
Everyday Examples
Sticker Prices and Discounts
A jacket marked "Was $300, now $120" is rarely a worse deal than the same jacket listed plainly at $120, but it usually feels like one. The $300 is doing anchoring work: the value of the jacket is judged relative to the higher number, making the $120 feel like a bargain. Retail pricing has been studied extensively in this context, and the anchoring effect on willingness to pay is consistent and substantial.
Restaurant Menus
An expensive item near the top of a menu — sometimes called a decoy entree — shifts the perceived value of the dishes that follow. Diners do not necessarily order the expensive item; they order the next-most-expensive one, which now looks reasonable. Menu engineering as a discipline relies heavily on anchoring of this kind.
Salary Negotiations
When asked early in a recruitment process, "What are your salary expectations?", a job candidate who quotes a number sets an anchor for the entire subsequent negotiation. Studies of negotiations, such as Adam Galinsky and Thomas Mussweiler's 2001 experiments, find that the first offer strongly predicts the final settlement, as long as it is not so extreme that it ends the conversation. Candidates who refuse to be first, or who anchor with a careful but ambitious figure, tend to fare better than those who let the employer set the anchor.
Real Estate
A house's listing price functions as an anchor for the offers it receives, even from buyers who have done their own comparable analyses. Sellers who price aggressively often receive higher offers in absolute terms, although they also risk longer time on market and may eventually accept less if the listing seems stuck. The anchoring effect helps explain why a listing's first asking price is so consequential.
Estimating Time and Money
Project managers asked how long a task will take often start from a previous similar task — an anchor — and adjust for differences. The result is the well-known phenomenon of underestimating project timelines, since the original anchor rarely accounted for the complications that the new project will encounter. The anchor-and-adjust pattern is part of the explanation for the planning fallacy.
Tip Suggestions
Many payment screens now offer suggested tip percentages — 18%, 20%, 25%. Studies have shown that the displayed defaults change the average tip, with higher suggestions producing higher tips. The customer is free to enter any amount, but the suggested numbers anchor the decision.
Charity Asks
Fundraising appeals that present donation options — "$25, $50, $100, $250" — anchor donors' choices in ways that affect the median donation. Including a higher option pulls average donations up, even among donors who do not choose the high option, because the high option recalibrates the sense of what a "normal" gift looks like.
Where It Shows Up
Negotiation
The first offer effect — that the party who makes the first credible offer in a negotiation tends to end up with a better outcome — is one of the most reliable findings in negotiation research. Anchoring is the central mechanism. The first offer defines a numerical landscape against which all subsequent offers are evaluated. Skilled negotiators take this seriously, opening with carefully calibrated numbers and, when on the receiving end, working actively to neutralize the anchor before responding.
Pricing and Marketing
The anchoring effect underlies many standard pricing tactics: list-price-then-discount, decoy products that make the target option look like a deal, and tiered pricing structures where a high-end option makes the middle option attractive. These tactics are robust enough to have become foundational in retail and software pricing.
Judicial Sentencing
Studies of judges and legal decision-makers have shown that proposed sentencing recommendations — from prosecutors, probation reports, or even seemingly irrelevant numerical primes — influence final sentences. Experiments with experienced judges presented with cases involving randomly generated sentencing demands have shown measurable anchoring effects on the sentences they then proposed.
Medical Diagnosis and Treatment
A patient's chart that already contains a tentative diagnosis biases subsequent clinicians toward that diagnosis. A reference range on a lab result anchors interpretation of the result. The first treatment proposed by a colleague anchors what alternatives are considered. Medical training increasingly emphasizes structured approaches that resist these effects.
Real Estate Appraisal
As noted earlier, listing prices serve as anchors even for trained appraisers. The implication is that the most experienced eyes in the market are not exempt from the bias, although their estimates may anchor less than non-experts'. Blind appraisal protocols — where the appraiser does not see the listing or seller's price — have been proposed to address this.
Finance and Forecasting
Analysts' earnings estimates tend to cluster around previous estimates and around what others are publishing — a pattern partly explained by anchoring. The same is true for many macroeconomic forecasts. Forecasts that "anchor" too heavily on the recent past struggle to predict regime changes.
Public Policy
When a budget conversation starts from "last year's number," the anchor is the previous budget. Proposals are evaluated as deviations from it. This makes large reallocations difficult even when underlying conditions have changed and a different starting point would be more appropriate. Zero-based budgeting was developed in part as a structural counter to the anchoring effect in this context.
Real-World Consequences
Money Left on the Table
In negotiations of every kind — salary, real estate, vendor contracts, divorce settlements — the anchor set early in the conversation predicts a large share of the final outcome. Parties who do not appreciate this can leave significant value on the table by deferring to the other side's opening number. Conversely, parties who use anchoring strategically can extract concessions disproportionate to the underlying merits.
Distorted Valuations
Markets are not immune. Initial public offering pricing, analyst estimates, and broker quotes all serve as anchors for participants whose own analysis is then biased by them. In thinly traded or hard-to-value markets, the gap between true value and anchored value can persist for long periods.
Unfair Outcomes in Justice
When judicial sentences are pulled by recommendations or by superficial numerical primes, defendants in similar cases receive systematically different treatment. The legal system has responded with sentencing guidelines, presumptive ranges, and other structural counters — although these counters themselves can act as anchors that may be over- or under-calibrated.
Misallocated Healthcare
In medicine, an early diagnostic anchor can lead to missed alternative diagnoses, sometimes with serious consequences. Reflective practices that explicitly consider "What else could this be?" before settling on a working diagnosis are designed to disrupt this pattern.
Bad Planning
Anchoring on prior project timelines, optimistic feasibility studies, or politically chosen budget figures contributes to systematic underestimation in large projects. Reference-class forecasting — comparing the current project to a distribution of similar past projects, rather than starting from a single anchor — was developed in part as a counter.
Manipulation by Sophisticated Actors
Once anchoring is understood, it can be used. Negotiators, marketers, fundraisers, and political operators routinely deploy anchors to steer the responses of others. Some of this is straightforwardly persuasive communication; some shades into manipulation. Either way, awareness of the bias on the other side is the first line of defense.
How to Recognize It in Yourself
Notice the First Number
Whenever a numerical decision is about to be made — a counter-offer, a budget proposal, a project estimate — pause to ask what number is already in your head, where it came from, and how much of your reasoning is implicitly starting from there. The number that arrived first is the one most likely to anchor the conversation. Naming it, even silently, weakens its grip.
Ask Whether You Adjusted Far Enough
If your final estimate is uncomfortably close to a salient anchor, ask whether you would have arrived at the same number if you had started from a different anchor. If the answer is plausibly no, your adjustment was probably insufficient. A useful exercise is to imagine three different anchors and see how far apart your estimates would be.
Look for Asymmetric Effort
Adjustment is typically faster and easier in one direction than another — usually away from the anchor by a comfortable distance and no further. If your reasoning has done most of its work pulling the answer slightly away from the anchor, rather than building the answer from independent considerations, the answer is probably anchored.
Watch for Suspect Sources
Anchors arrive from a wide variety of sources, not all of them credible. The listing price set by a motivated seller, the salary band quoted by a recruiter with an incentive to keep it low, the time estimate offered by a hopeful project sponsor — each of these is a number with a story behind it. Asking who set the anchor and what their incentive was helps de-anchor.
Track Your Initial Versus Final Estimates
If you make many estimates in a domain, it is worth occasionally logging both your initial impression and your final, considered estimate. Over time, you can see how often the gap between them is large versus small. A consistently small gap suggests you are anchoring on your first impression more than is healthy.
How to Counter It
Generate Your Own Reference Points
Before being exposed to someone else's anchor, generate your own reasoned estimate. In salary negotiations, this means doing the research and writing down a target range before the recruiter asks. In project planning, it means estimating effort from first principles before reading the previous team's estimates. In purchasing decisions, it means knowing what you would pay before seeing the sticker. A well-prepared internal anchor competes with the external one.
Use Multiple Anchors
If a single anchor exerts gravity, multiple anchors dilute it. Looking up several comparable properties before evaluating a real estate listing, or considering several base-rate cases before estimating a probability, generates a distribution rather than a point and reduces the influence of any one number. The technique is related to reference-class forecasting and to formal Bayesian reasoning.
Commit to Ranges, Not Points
Where possible, express estimates as ranges, with the bounds set by considering plausible high and low scenarios rather than by adjusting outward from a central anchor. Forecasting research has shown that people forced to articulate confidence intervals are typically less anchored — and better calibrated — than those who quote a single number.
Consider the Opposite
As with confirmation bias, the consider-the-opposite prompt has shown real effects in anchoring research. Before settling on an estimate, ask: "What reasons can I generate for thinking the answer is much higher than the anchor? Much lower?" This exercise activates information that the anchor's selective-accessibility effect was suppressing.
Make the Anchor Explicit
Strange as it sounds, naming the anchor out loud reduces its effect somewhat. In a negotiation, saying "Your opening of X is interesting; let me set it aside and walk through how I came to my own number" creates psychological distance from the anchor. The technique is used by experienced negotiators precisely because it disrupts the anchor's quiet pull.
Use Structured Approaches
Decision processes that require explicit reasoning — pre-mortems, structured analytic techniques, formal decision matrices, blinded appraisal — make anchoring harder by routing judgments through procedures that do not depend on a single starting number. The effects can be substantial in domains where the procedure can be enforced.
Be Strategic About First Offers
If you are negotiating, do not surrender the anchor lightly. When circumstances permit, make a thoughtful first offer based on a defensible analysis. When you cannot, prepare to neutralize the other side's anchor — by acknowledging it, articulating your own reasoning explicitly, and moving the conversation to the underlying issues before counter-offering.
Limits of Debiasing
Awareness Is Not Enough
Studies that have warned participants about anchoring before exposing them to anchors, such as work by Timothy Wilson and colleagues in 1996, have found that warnings produce little or no reduction in the effect. Knowing about the bias is necessary but not sufficient; the anchor still does work even when its presence is named. This is part of why structural counters tend to be more reliable than personal vigilance.
Strong Anchors Are Hard to Neutralize
Some anchors are simply too central to a problem to be set aside. The previous year's budget, the listing price of the house, the prosecutor's recommended sentence — these are not numbers you can pretend you have not seen. The best one can do is generate strong independent reasoning, use multiple reference points, and route the decision through processes that make the anchor's influence visible and contestable.
Experts Anchor Too
The finding that real estate agents, judges, and physicians show anchoring effects is sobering for any institution that relies on expert judgment. Expertise reduces noise and increases overall accuracy, but it does not abolish anchoring. Institutions that depend on expert judgment can supplement it with decision aids, blinded protocols, and structured processes — but they should not assume that expertise alone is enough.
Limits of Range-Setting
Asking people to commit to ranges helps, but ranges themselves can be anchored. A range built by adjusting outward from an anchor will often be too narrow and too centered on the anchor. The best ranges are constructed from independent considerations of upper and lower bounds — what is the highest reasonable case, and what is the lowest? — and then combined.
Structural Solutions
As with other robust biases, the most durable counters are structural. Blinded appraisal, multiple-bid auctions, zero-based budgeting, sentencing guidelines, reference-class forecasting, and standardized clinical protocols all work by limiting the influence that any single anchor can have. They embed disagreement and external reference points into the decision process so that no individual judge has to resist the anchor alone.
Living With Anchoring
The realistic stance is that you will be anchored. The questions are by what, by whom, and with what consequences. The best defense is preparation — knowing your own anchor before someone else gives you theirs — and a habit of generating independent estimates whenever the stakes warrant it. Awareness, paired with practice and structure, will not abolish the effect, but it can keep it small enough to matter less than it otherwise would.
Conclusion
Anchoring bias is one of the most robust findings in the psychology of judgment. From Tversky and Kahneman's rigged wheel of fortune to modern studies of salary negotiations and judicial sentencing, the basic pattern has repeated across decades and domains: an initial number, however arbitrary, tugs subsequent estimates toward it, and the pull is larger than the people doing the estimating realize. The mechanism is partly insufficient adjustment from the anchor, partly selective accessibility of information consistent with it, and partly the brain's general willingness to use whatever happens to be in the cognitive workspace.
What makes anchoring practical to think about is that the mechanisms can be partially countered. Generating one's own estimates before being exposed to others', using multiple reference points, considering the opposite, expressing judgments as ranges, and routing important decisions through structured processes all reduce — though they do not eliminate — the effect. Experts are not exempt, which is one of the reasons that institutional design matters as much as individual technique.
If you remember nothing else, remember this: the first number you see, hear, or write down is doing more of the work than feels right. In negotiation, in pricing, in planning, in self-assessment, that initial value is shaping everything that comes after, and your felt sense of having made an independent judgment is precisely the part the anchor is most reliably distorting. Treating that feeling with suspicion — and replacing it with prepared, reasoned, externally checked estimates — is one of the most practical applications of cognitive psychology to everyday decision-making.
Frequently asked questions
What is anchoring bias in simple terms?
Anchoring bias is the habit of relying too heavily on the first number or piece of information you encounter when making a judgment. That first value acts like an anchor: you adjust away from it, but usually not far enough. A high asking price makes a later offer feel reasonable, and a low first estimate drags down the final one, even if the starting figure was random.
Who discovered anchoring bias?
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman described the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic in their 1974 Science paper, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Their wheel-of-fortune and multiplication studies became the classic demonstrations. Earlier psychophysics research had noted similar context effects on judgments, but Tversky and Kahneman framed anchoring as a general heuristic in decision-making, which shaped decades of later work.
What is an example of anchoring bias?
A common example is a sale tag that reads was $300, now $120. The $300 anchors your sense of the jacket's value, so $120 feels like a bargain even if the jacket was never worth $300. Other examples include the first offer in a salary negotiation, suggested tip percentages on payment screens and a tentative diagnosis already written in a patient's chart.
Is anchoring bias the same as confirmation bias?
No, although they can work together. Anchoring is about over-relying on a starting value when estimating or judging. Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek and favor evidence that supports what you already believe. The selective accessibility account of anchoring links the two: considering an anchor brings anchor-consistent information to mind, a process that resembles confirmation bias.
Does knowing about anchoring bias protect you from it?
Only a little. Experiments that warned people about anchoring found that warnings had small or no effects, and experts who know about the bias still show it. More reliable strategies change the process: writing down your own estimate before seeing anyone else's, gathering several comparison points, deliberately arguing for a very different answer and using blinded or structured procedures for important decisions.
Sources
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
- Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(3), 437–446.
- Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-and-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39(1), 84–97.
- Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of irrelevant anchors on experts' judicial decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(2), 188–200.
- Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657–669.
- Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2003). "Coherent arbitrariness": Stable demand curves without stable preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 73–106.
- Klein, R. A., et al. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A "many labs" replication project. Social Psychology, 45(3), 142–152.
- Wilson, T. D., Houston, C. E., Etling, K. M., & Brekke, N. (1996). A new look at anchoring effects: Basic anchoring and its antecedents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125(4), 387–402.